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I. INTRODUCTION

The cast of characters in the conflict of laws have curwus
names-renvoi,
depec;age, false conflicts, true conflicts,
comparative impairment, choice-influencing considerations. This
Article concerns one of the strangest: the unprovided-for case. The
unprovided-for case is a puzzle that arises, primarily concerning
tort cases, under the dominant choice-of-law approach used in the
United States, governmental interest analysis. As its name
suggests, in the unprovided-for case the tort law of no jurisdiction
appears to apply. There is a gap in the law.
One might think that the solution is simple. When a court faces
a gap in the law, it looks to relevant regulatory policies and creates
a legal rule to fill the gap. But this is not how interest analysts
have tried to solve the unprovided-for case. It is a fundamental
commitment among conflicts scholars of all stripes that law is
applied in conflicts cases. It is not made.! For the unprovided-for
case to be solved, preexisting law must be found to fill the gap that
the unprovided-for case apparently presents.
The most influential argument along these lines was offered by
Larry Kramer, in his 1989 article The Myth of the "UnprovidedFor" Case. 2 Kramer's solution has not only been largely accepted
by interest analysts, 3 it also appears to have silenced critics.

1 But see infra note 126 (discussing briefly some conflicts scholars wh<i characterize
courts as making law in conflicts cases).
2 75 VA. L. REV. 1045.
3 Kermit Roosevelt-the Reporter for the new Third Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws-is a prominent example of an interest analyst who accepts Kramer's argument,
although he disagrees about the effect that the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1, has on (putative) unprovided-for cases. Kermit Roosevelt III, The
Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2520-25 (1999). See
infra note 78. For other examples of conflicts scholars who accept Kramer's argument
(although not always his claims about the effect of the Clause), see Mark D. Rosen, Choiceof-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1082 (2015) (stating
that Kramer's argument is "irrefutably sound"); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of
Choice of Law: The Restatement (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329,
347--49 (1997) (accepting Kramer's argument); Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's
Governmental Interest Analysis, in 215 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 161-64 (1989) (same). But
see Louise Weinberg, A Radically Transformed Restatement for Conflicts, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1999, 2009-10 n.37 (rejecting Kramer's argument, although not for the reasons I offer
in this Article).
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I will argue that Kramer's solution fails. He finds applicable
laws in unprovided-for cases only by using an unsustainably broad
definition of a law, a definition that generates intractable puzzles
if consistently employed. What Kramer actually shows is not that
law always applies in the unprovided-for case, but that regulatory
policies can always be found to recommend law to fill the gap that
the unprovided-for case creates. But these policies are reasons for
laws. They are not themselves laws.
The recognition that law must be made in the unprovided-for
case is much more than a solution to a technical problem in the
interest analysis approach. It revolutionizes the entire field. Once
it is acknowledged that a court makes law in the unprovided-for
case by taking into account freestanding regulatory policies, one
cannot avoid the conclusion that it must do the same in every
conflicts case, for these policies are relevant to them too. 4 The
result is that interest analysis collapses, leaving no clear
replacement. Or so I shall argue.

II. SOME BACKGROUND
Two main conflicts approaches are used in the United States.
The oldest is vested rights theory.
A. VESTED RIGHTS THEORY

Vested rights theory is best exemplified in the First
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, for which the Harvard law
professor (and first dean of the University of Chicago Law School)
Joseph Henry Beale was the Reporter. Although dominant in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is now retained
by only around ten states. 5 Its conceptual foundation is a principle

See infra note 125 for one small exception.
See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty·
Eighth Annual Survey, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 351 (2015) (noting that Alabama, Georgia,
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wyoming still use the First Restatement for tort cases).
4

5
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of exclusive legislative jurisdiction: a sovereign necessarily has
sole lawmaking power over events within its borders.6
Assume two married Californians are in a car accident in
Georgia due to the wife's negligence. The husband sues the wife
for compensation. Georgia law bars interspousal negligence suits. 7
California law allows them. 8 Which law should the court use?
To the vested rights theorist, only Georgia law applies, because
only Georgia lawmakers can legally regulate accidents that occur
within the borders of the state. 9 When the accident occurred in
Georgia, it became a fact that a Georgia legal right (protecting the
wife from liability) was created.l 0 That fact-that a Georgia legal

6 See 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 46 (1935) ("[T]he law
must extend over the entire territory subject to it and apply to every act done there, but only
one law can so apply."); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFUCT OF LAWS 19 (1834)
("(E) very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory.").
7 See O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8 (2016) (stating that spouses enjoy interspousal tort immunity);
Bassett v. Harrington, 543 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. 2000) ("Under the common law doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity (codified at OCGA § 19-3-8), actions between spouses for
personal torts committed by one spouse against the other are barred .... ").
8 See Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962) (holding that interspousal immunity no
longer exists for either intentional torts or torts based on negligence).
9 This theory of exclusive legislative jurisdiction was complemented by a theory of
exclusive adjudicative jurisdiction, famously expressed by Justice Field in Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[E)very state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory."). The courts of only one sovereign have the
power to issue a judgment binding upon the person of the defendant (that is, a judgment in
personam), namely, the sovereign within whose borders the defendant happens to be at the
initiation of the suit. By the same token, the courts of only one sovereign have the power to
issue a judgment binding upon the property of the defendant (that is, a judgment in rem or
quasi in rem), namely, the jurisdiction within whose borders the property happens to be at
the initiation of the suit. A judgment of a court with adjudicative jurisdiction also creates a
vested right, which other court systems ought to respect.
10 What happens, one might ask, when the accident itself crosses borders, for example,
when the negligent act occurs in Alabama and the resulting harm in Mississippi? E.g.,
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 804 (Ala. 1892) (negligent act
committed by one employee in Alabama caused train to uncouple in Mississippi, causing harm
to another employee). To Beale, the fact that the last event necessary to create the legal right
at issue occurred within Mississippi's borders made it self-evident that Mississippi, and it
alone, has lawmaking power. &e RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-378
(1934) (stating that "[t]he place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place," and "[t]he law of the place of the wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury"). It is for the same reason that he
claimed that the law of the place of acceptance, which is the last event necessary to create a
contractual obligation, governed the validity and interpretation of a contract, no matter where
the offer was made, the contracting parties reside, or performance was to occur. See
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right had vested--ought to be respected by every sovereign's
courts.l 1
For the vested rights theorist, a sovereign's lawmaking power is
not merely exclusive, it is compulsory. A sovereign cannot fail to
legally regulate everything within its sphere of lawmaking
authority. As Beale put it: "It is unthinkable in a civilized country
that any act should fall outside of the domain of law. If law be
regarded as a command, then every act done must either be
permitted or forbidden." 12 There can be no "hiatus or vacuum in
the law." 13 For example, if an action is subject to Georgia's
exclusive legislative jurisdiction and one can find no Georgia law
that forbids the action, then necessarily the action is permitted.
There is no other alternative.l 4 It follows that there are no gaps in
conflicts cases.
No one, to my knowledge, accepts this theory of exclusive
legislative jurisdiction anymore. Sovereigns, we assume, have
concurrent regulatory power over transactions that have
connections with more than one jurisdiction. 15 Both Georgia and
California officials can legally regulate accidents in Georgia
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311, 332 (1934) (stating that the law of the
place of contracting governs questions of the validity of a contract).
11 See 3 BEALE, supra note 6, at 1969 ("The law annexes to the event a certain
consequence, namely, the creation of a legal right ... When a right has been created by
law, this right itself becomes a fact . . . [T]he existing right should everywhere be
recognized; since to do so is merely to recognize the existence of a fact."). Despite his theory
of vested rights, Beale did not think that a foreign court is legally obligated to acknowledge
these rights. Assume a California court has adjudicative jurisdiction over the California
wife, because she was within the borders of California at the initiation of the suit. If the
court were legally obligated to use Georgia law to adjudicate the husband's claim against
her, the California court's exclusive power over persons and property within its borders
would be compromised. Vested rights create legal reasons for territorial choice-of-law rules,
but they do not legally obligate courts to adopt such rules. For a further discussion, see
Michael S. Green, Legal Monism: An American History, in VIENNA LECTURES ON LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY (Hart Publishing, forthcoming) (describing the vested rights approach);
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 2456 (same).
12 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at 45.
13

Id.

This extends to all legal questions, such as duties of compensation. If looking to
Georgia law does not show that someone suffering a harm in Georgia has a right to
compensation, then necessarily he has no such right.
15 See, e.g., Michael S. Green, Vertical Power, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 73, 81-85 (2014)
(discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of concurrent regulatory authority between
states and between states and the federal government).
14
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involving Californians. 16 Indeed, concurrent regulatory power is
now established constitutional law. The Supreme Court long ago
abandoned its quixotic project of using the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Due Pro~ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to divide states' lawmaking powers into exclusive spheres.l 7 As
the Court now sees it, a number of states may permissibly extend
their law to an event, provided that there is "a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of [the state's] law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair." 18 Concurrent legislative jurisdiction has
also been accepted as a matter of internationallaw.l 9
In addition, legal regulation is now seen as a discretionary
matter, rather than something metaphysically compelled. 2o If two
sovereigns have the power to regulate, to insist that they both
exercise that power would force them to engage in regulatory
warfare. But it is surely possible that one sovereign might choose
not to exercise its power because it thinks that the other has. The
question is no longer whether a Californian's action in Georgia is
legally forbidden or permitted under Georgia law. There is a third
option. The action may be neither forbidden nor permitted.
Georgia officials may have chosen to leave a legal void to be filled
with California law.

16 See id. at 82 (noting that "a state can extend its tort law to a transaction even if the
harm occurred outside its borders").
17 See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 376--77 (1918) (reading into Due
Process Clause the rule that the law of the state of contracting determines validity and
scope of a contract).
1 8 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
Paired with this theory of
concurrent legislative jurisdiction is a theory of concurrent adjudicative jurisdiction, as
expressed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). As the Supreme
Court now sees it, more than one jurisdiction's courts are empowered under the Due Process
Clause to assert jurisdiction in personam. Even though the defendant is currently outside its
borders, a state court can still subject him to in personam jurisdiction, provided that there are
minimum contacts with the state such that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant does
not offend "traditional notions affair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316.
19 Under international law, a sovereign can have legislative jurisdiction over a
transaction outside of its borders, for example, when the transaction involves its nationals.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987) ("[A) state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... the activities, interests, status, or relations
of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.").
zo See infra Section II.B.l.
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If the conceptual foundation of vested rights theory has been
rejected, why do some states still hang onto it? The main reason is
its (apparent) predictability and ease of application. 21 Under
vested rights theory, choosing law turns out to be simple, at least
in theory: just identify the sovereign that people in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thought had exclusive
lawmaking power over the event being adjudicated. In tort cases,
this is the sovereign where the harm occurred. 22 In contract cases,
it is the sovereign where the contract was entered into. 23
But if lawmaking power is concurrent, vested rights theorywhatever its predictability and ease of application-is irrational.
If Georgia and California can both legally regulate an event in
Georgia, Georgia may have chosen not to extend its law to the
event out of deference to California's regulatory interests. To
nevertheless apply Georgia law on the basis of an outdated theory
of exclusive regulatory power frustrates California's regulatory
interests without providing Georgia with any corresponding
benefit.
It is not surprising, therefore, that courts that use the vested
rights approach rely on numerous "escape devices" that allow them
to avoid the recommended choice, in favor of one more in keeping
with governmental interests. 24 But with these escape devices in
place, the predictability and ease of application that were the main
virtues of vested rights theory vanish.

21 See, e.g., General Tel. Co. &c. v. Trimm, 311 S.E.2d 460, 460 (1984) ("Although [interest
analysis] is a more recent development in choice of law cases, we are impressed with the
findings of other jurisdictions that this approach is neither less confusing nor more certain
than our traditional approach."); McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Va. 1979) ("[W]e
do not think that the uniformity, predictability, and ease of application of the Virginia rule
should be abandoned.").
22 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-379 (1934) (stating that the
law ofthe "place of wrong" determines liability under tort).
23 I d. §§ 311, 332 (stating the law of the "place of contracting" determines the validity of a
contract).
24 See LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 226--29 (1986) (describing use of escape devices); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, CONFLICT
OF LAws 14-28 (2010) (same).
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B. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS

The remaining forty states, as well as the District of Columbia,
have adopted some form of governmental interest analysis, which
is based on the recognition that sovereigns can have concurrent
regulatory power. 25 To find out whether a jurisdiction's officials
have chosen to extend their law to the facts of a conflicts case,
interest analysts argue, a court should rely on the usual method
for interpreting laws' scope.26
1. False Conflicts. Consider a Georgia court adjudicating a case
that presents no interjurisdictional problems. Two Georgians, who
are married but legally separated, are in a car accident in Georgia
due to the wife's negligence. The husband sues the wife for
compensation under Georgia negligence law. The wife points to a
Georgia statute codifying the common law rule of interspousal
immunity. 27
The court seems to face a conflict of Georgia laws. Each party
points to a Georgia law that appears to apply (negligence law and
the interspousal immunity statute) and the court must choose
25 As for federal courts, they usually do not use their own choice-of-law approach. When
sitting in diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, they use the choice-of-law approach of the
state where they are located_ See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497
(1941). But in certain federal question cases-for example, maritime cases whose facts
might fall under federal law or the law of a foreign nation-they use what amounts to an
interest analysis approach. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 592 (1953) (looking, in
part, to residence of parties to choose Danish law over American law); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970) (looking, in part, to residence of parties to choose Greek
law over American law); see generally Symeon Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts of Law from
the Perspective of Modern Choice of Law Methodology, 7 MAR. LAW. 223 (1982).
26 The idea that a court addressing a conflicts case should approach it the same way that
a court adjudicating a case with purely domestic facts does is a pervasive theme among
interest analysts. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
183-84 (1963) (describing the process as "essentially the familiar one of constriction or
interpretation" when adjudicating cases); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The
Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821,
1888-89 (2005) ("[T]he idea that conflicts should return from its self-imposed exile and
rejoin the body of ordinary legal analysis is a staple of the literature."); Larry Kramer,
Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005 (1991) (stating that the only difference
between choice of law and other legal problems is that "some of the facts are connected to
different states").
27 O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8; see Bassett v. Harrington, 543 S.E.2d 798, 799 (Ga. 2000) (stating
that under Georgia law "actions between spouses for personal torts committed by one
spouse against the other are barred").
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between them. One might think that the court should rely on legal
principles that deal with such conflicts, for example, that laws
enacted later defeat those enacted earlier (lex posterior derogat legi
priori), that statutes trump common law, that more specific
statutes take precedence over more general ones (lex specialis
derogat legi generali), and so on. Using these principles, the
interspousal immunity statute should obviously take priority.
But before the court makes a choice of law, shouldn't it first
determine whether both laws actually apply to the facts? Perhaps
the interspousal immunity statute is inapplicable to separated
spouses. In fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia asked this very
question in Harris v. Harris.2s
One could imagine the court resolving the question by looking
to the plain text of the statute. The statute says that spouses are
not permitted to sue one another for negligence, and separated
spouses are still spouses. 29 But the court assumed that the term
"spouses" was not intended to answer the question. Since no
textual resolution of the statute's scope was possible, it looked to
the statute's purposes, in order to determine whether they would
be vindicated through its application to the facts.
Interspousal immunity, the court concluded, exists to encourage
marital harmony and to keep spouses from engaging in insurance
fraud by staging accidents. 30 The statute should not be read as
applying to separated spouses, therefore, because there is no
significant marital harmony to disturb and no serious worry about
collusion and fraud. 31 There was no conflict of laws after all. Only
Georgia negligence law applied.
The interest analyst argues that the same method should be
used when the laws of different jurisdictions appear to conflict.
The scope of the laws at issue should first be examined to see if the
apparent conflict is real. Consider our case of two married
313 S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. 1984).
O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8. Technically, the statute says only that "[i]nterspousal tort immunity,
as it existed immediately prior to July 1, 1983, shall continue to exist on and after July 1,
1983." But the common law rule referred to speaks of "spouses." E.g., Robeson v. Int'l Indem.
Co., 282 S.E.2d 896, 897 (Ga. 1981) (stating that common law rule concerns "personal torts
committed by one spouse against the other").
30 Id. at 898.
3 1 Harris, 313 S.E.2d at 89-90.
2s

29
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Californians who are in a car accident in Georgia.3 2 Should
Georgia's interspousal immunity statute be used, or California
law, which allows for interspousal negligence liability? Before
relying on some principle for resolving a conflict between two
jurisdictions' laws, the court should first determine whether there
is a conflict at all.
Textualism cannot answer this question, because laws rarely
limit their territorial scope explicitly. 33 If one were to follow their
plain meaning, they would apply to everyone, everywhere in the
world. 34 Georgia's interspousal immunity statute speaks of spouses,
not Georgia spouses or spouses who get into accidents in Georgia. 35
Under a purely textualist reading, the statute applies to Mongolian
spouses who get into accidents in Finland. Courts must therefore
look to laws' purposes to determine their territorial scope.
The purposes of Georgia's interspousal immunity statute, as we
have seen, are encouraging marital harmony and avoiding
insurance fraud. 36 But these purposes are irrelevant, the interest
analyst would argue, concerning a California married couple that
gets into an accident in Georgia. Georgia lawmakers aren't
interested in the marital harmony of California couples or fraud
concerning California insurance contracts. Those are California's
concern.
So Georgia law does not apply. By contrast, California law
does. The purposes of California law are those of negligence law
generally-deterrence and compensation. California lawmakers
believe in deterring interspousal negligence and compensating
those harmed by such negligence. 37 True, they are probably not
interested in deterring interspousal negligence in Georgia, even
32 The Californians are not separated, making the exception in Harris v. Harris
inapplicable.
33 For a rare counterexample, see WIS. STAT. § 895.03 (2015) (action for wrongful death
"caused in this state").
34 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1052-53.
35 In fact, the statute refers to the common law rule. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-8. But the language
of the common law rule refers to spouses generally, without any territorial limitation.
Robeson, 282 S.E.2d at 897.
36 Id. at 898.
37 See Klein, 376 P.2d at 72-73 (stressing that it is "fundamental in the law of torts that
any person proximately injured by the act of another, whether that act be willful or
negligent, should ... be compensated'').
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when it is a· Californian who is negligent. That's Georgia's
business. But California's compensatory interest in the case is
real. California lawmakers want all Californians harmed due to
the negligence of a spouse to be made whole, no matter where the
accident occurred.
As the interest analyst would describe it, our case is a false
conflict, in which no choice of law is necessary. 38 Only California
law applies. The recommendation of vested rights theory, which is
to use the law of the place of the accident (here, Georgia's
interspousal immunity statute), frustrates the purposes of the only
interested jurisdiction. 39
2. Loss-Allocating and Conduct-Regulating Rules. The way the
interest analyst reads laws' territorial scope (particularly in tort
cases) depends upon a distinction between conduct-regulating and
loss-allocating rules. A rule is conduct-regulating if it imposes a
duty of compensation as a means of discouraging people from
engaging in the conduct that gave rise to the plaintiffs harm.
And, if the rule limits or rejects a duty of compensation, it is
conduct-regulating if it seeks to give people the freedom to engage
in the conduct. 4
For example, negligence liability is conductregulating to the extent that it imposes liability in order to
discourage negligent conduct. And barring liability when someone
causes harm through non-negligent conduct is conduct-regulating
to the extent that it is intended to give people the freedom to
engage in such conduct.
If all laws were solely conduct-regulating, there would be few
cases in which interest analysis and vested rights theory come out
differently, for interest analysts understand the scope of conductregulating rules territorially. The jurisdiction that created the

°

38 The cases in which states have abandoned vested rights theory for interest analysis have
almost always been false conflicts. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 285 (N.Y.
1963); Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 311 (Li. 1973); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES,
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTuRE 145 (2006).
39 E.g., Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1989) (using interest analysis
to apply California negligence law rather than Utah's rule of interspousal immunity to suit
by California wife against her husband concerning an accident in Utah).
•o Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1989) (discussing
"liberty interests" in tort law that "grant people freedom to act without regard to the
consequences to others").
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conduct-regulating rule is interested in its applying to all
instances of the conduct in the jurisdiction and all instances of the
conduct outside the jurisdiction that cause harm m the
jurisdiction. 41 The residence of the parties is irrelevant.
A rule is loss-allocating, by contrast, if it imposes or bars a duty
of compensation for different reasons than discouraging or
encouraging the conduct that gave rise to the plaintiffs harm. 42
With respect to some loss-allocating rules, the purpose is
vindicating a view about the appropriate ex post distribution of the
loss between the plaintiff and the defendant. An example is
respondeat superior, that is, the rule holding an employer
vicariously liable for the torts of its employees, even though the
employer behaved non-negligently in hiring and supervision. The
rule is not conduct-regulating, because holding the employer liable
is not intended to change the employer's hiring and supervision: by
assumption the employer acted with due care. The rule is instead
the expression of a judgment that the loss ought to be put on the
employer, particularly when employees are commonly without
sufficient assets to provide compensation to the plaintiff
themselves.
Some rules perform both conduct-regulating and loss-allocating
functions. Negligence liability is an example. Its goals are
deterring negligent conduct and making those who suffer harm
41 The only way that interest analysis and vested rights theory would come out
differently concerning conduct-regulating rules is when the harm and the conduct at issue
occurred in different jurisdictions. See supra note 10.
42 See Joseph William Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 207 (1991)
(" 'Loss-allocating' rules are intended to place the losses occasioned by social activity on the
appropriate party even if those rules will leave unaffected the intensity, frequency, or manner
of the harmful activity."). For more on the distinction, see generally SYMEONIDES, supra note
38, at 123-40; Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis
Approach to Choice of Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 88384 (1990). In New York, the distinction is explicitly relied on in its choice-of-law rules for
torts. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455-58 (N.Y. 1972) (using the distinction).
The distinction is also used in Oregon and Louisiana's choice-of-law statutes. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 15.440 (2016); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 3542-48 (2016). For criticism of the distinction, see
Wendy Collins Perdue, A Reexamination of the Distinction between "Loss-Allocating" and
"Conduct-Regulating Rules," 60 LA. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2000) (using the examples of strict
liability and limits on damages); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative
Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 405 (1980) ("[M]any of the statutes that interest analysts call
protective or compensatory alter incentives in a way that suggests that the legislature was
aware of, and probably approved of, their regulatory effects.").
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from such conduct whole. But some rules, such as respondeat
superior, are commonly understood as solely loss-allocating.
Although I will use the term "loss-allocating" myself, I should
note that it is misleading, for some "loss-allocating" rules have as
their purpose the encouragement or discouragement of conduct.
The relevant conduct, however, is something other than the
conduct that created the plaintiffs harm. Interspousal immunity
is an example. The rule is not described as conduct-regulating,
because it does not have as its purpose making spouses feel free to
behave negligently toward one another. But at least one of its
purposes is discouraging a certain form of conduct, namely staging
accidents in order to defraud insurance companies. 43
It is concerning loss-allocating rules that interest analysis and
vested rights theory come out very differently. The vested rights
theorist treats loss-allocating and conduct-regulating tort rules the
same-the law of the place of the harm applies. For the interest
analyst, by contrast, the scope of a loss-allocating rule is generally
tied to the residence of one or both of the parties. .Georgia's
interspousal immunity statute, for example, applies only to
Georgia couples, including Georgia couples who get into accidents
in other states. It does not apply to Californians who get into
accidents in Georgia.
3. True Conflicts. To repeat, in the false conflict context, no
choice of law is necessary, because only one jurisdiction's law
applies. Only if the case is a true conflict, in which at least one
purpose of each jurisdiction's law would be furthered by the law's
application to the facts, is a genuine choice of law required. An
example of a true conflict is a Georgia married couple's accident in
California. California is interested in its negligence law (in its
conduct-regulating function) being used, as a means of deterring
interspousal negligence in the state, and Georgia is interested in
43 An example of a ''loss-allocating" rule that has as one of its purposes encouraging activity
is charitable immunity, in which a charity is not liable for harm resulting from its negligent
hiring or supervision of workers. The rule is not conduct-regulating, for negligent hiring and
supervision are admittedly wrongful. The rule is not meant to make charities feel free to
negligently hire and supervise. See generally SYMEON SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (2008); see also Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d
679, 684-88 (N.Y. 1985). But the rule arguably does seek to encourage a certain type of
conduct, namely charitable activity, by lowering its cost. SYMEONIDES, supra, at 200.
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its interspousal immunity statute being used, as a means of
encouraging the marital harmony of Georgia couples and
preventing fraud concerning Georgia insurance contracts.
Although all interest analysis approaches generally come to the
same conclusion about false conflicts, 44 they disagree about how
true conflicts should be resolved. 45 Brainerd Currie, the father of
interest analysis, argued that a court is institutionally obligated to
favor the interests of its own jurisdiction, even if these interests
are weaker. 46
Kentucky and Michigan are two states that
44 I include the Second Restatement here.
Under the Second Restatement, a court
chooses "the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (1971). In determining which jurisdiction has the most significant
relationship, a court looks, at least in part (and often solely), to the interests of the forum
and the other relevant jurisdictions. Thus, the Second Restatement also recommends that
interspousal immunity be governed by the law of the place of the marital domicile, id. § 169,
and many courts in Second Restatement jurisdictions would describe our example of a
California married couple's accident in Georgia as a "false conflict." See William A. Reppy,
Jr., Codifying Interest Analysis in the Torts Chapter of a New Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND.
L.J. 591, 591-93 (2000) (describing how numerous jurisdictions engraft the concept of a
false conflict onto the Second Restatement).
45 Part of the problem is that a proper resolution would appear to require a court to
compare the strengths of the jurisdictions' competing purposes. And interjurisdictional utility
comparisons, like interpersonal utility comparisons, are impossible. See generally Daniel M.
Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND 473, 473-90
(1995). For a discussion of this problem, see ROOSEVELT, supra note 24, at 66--67. Hence the
attraction of the false conflict, in which no weighing of one jurisdiction's interest against
another's is necessary, because there is only one jurisdiction with an interest in its law
applying. The false conflict is the jurisprudential version of a Pareto superior change in
distribution; that is, a change in which at least one party is made better off and no one is made
worse off. Welfare maximizers like the Pareto superior change because they can know that it
increases aggregate utility without having to engage in interpersonal utility comparisons. See
generally Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 85 (1992).
46 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 119 (describing this obligation as the "sensible and clearly
constitutional thing for any court to do"); ROOSEVELT, supra note 24, at 44-45 (Currie
"[a]ssume[s] a quite selfish state, concerned only with promoting its own interests; a state,
if you please, blind to consequences, and interested only in short-run 'gains'"). It is true
that the result will be that the law used will depend upon where the action is brought, but
Currie thought that the resolution of that problem should be left to Congress, using its
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to resolve. Brainerd Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233,
1243 (1963). The only exception to this preference for forum law is when the existence of a
true conflict gives the forum's sovereign a reason to relinquish its interest. Currie described
this as the "moderate and restrained interpretation" of forum interest. Brainerd Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963). But he
appeared to limit it to cases where the forum yields out of concern for the reasonable
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arguably have adopted this strong preference for forum law in true
conflicts. 47 But most states allow forum interests to yield, at
times, to the interests of another jurisdiction. 48
C. UNPROVIDED-FOR CASES

Although true conflicts are problematic, they are not
theoretically puzzling. It is expected that jurisdictions' regulatory
interests will sometimes conflict and that some method of
resolving these conflicts is needed. But what happens if an
examination of laws' purposes leads the court to conclude that
neither jurisdiction's law applies? Interest analysts call these
unprovided-for cases.
expectations of the parties. This is suggested by his use of Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d
906 (Cal. 1961), as an example of the moderate and restrained interpretation in action.
Currie, supra, at 757-58.
4 7 Symeonides, supra note 5, at 351.
48 For example, some states use Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations" approach.
Under this approach, a court may prefer one jurisdiction's law over another in a true
conflict-including foreign over forum law--on the ground that the chosen law is "better."
The five states that use Leflar's approach for tort cases are Arkansas, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Id. See, e.g., Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550
S.W.2d 453, 456-59 (Ark. 1977); Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 1973);
Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (N.H. 1966); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917, 923
(R.I. 1968); Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 672 (Wis. 1967). Deciding on the basis of the
better law is only one consideration out of five that might be used to resolve true conflicts
under Leflar's approach.
Other considerations include predictability of results,
maintenance of interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, and
advancement of the forum's governmental interests. Robert A Leflar, Conflicts Law: More
on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1586-88 (1966).
Other interest analysis approaches avoid normatively assessing the laws at issue.
California, for example, uses William Baxter's comparative impairment approach, in which
a court facing a true conflict chooses the law whose underlying purposes would be most
impaired if it were not used. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1963); see generally Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative
Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL.
L. REV. 577 (1980). For an argument that California has recently retreated from the
comparative impairment approach, see Michael H. Hoffheimer, California's Territorial Thrn
in Choice of Law, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 167 (2015).
Of the remaining states that have moved away from vested rights theory, the vast
majority have adopted the Second Restatement. Just how true conflicts are to be resolved
under the Second Restatement is hard to discern, because the identification of false conflicts
and the various means for resolving true ones are all lumped together haphazardly in a
master rule used to determine which state has the "most significant relationship."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 6 (1971).
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1. Neumeier v. Kuehner. For an example of an unprovided-for
case, consider Neumeier v. Kuehner (with its facts somewhat
simplified in a manner that doesn't affect the analysis). 49 A New
Yorker driving with an Ontario guest gets into an accident in
Ontario. The Ontario guest sues the New York host for negligence
in New York state court. 50 Ontario has a guest statute, which bars
guests in cars from suing their hosts for negligence. Under New
York law, hosts can be liable to guests for negligence. Which law
should the court use?
As we've seen, under interest analysis a court should first
determine the purposes of each law involved and then decide
whether these purposes would be vindicated by the law's
application to the facts of the conflicts case. The New York Court
of Appeals had earlier concluded that the purpose of Ontario's
guest statute is discouraging the guest and host from staging an
accident so that they can collect from the host's insurance
company. 51 The guest statute is therefore a loss-allocating rule,
which applies only when the host is from Ontario. If the host is
from another jurisdiction, the consequences of the possible fraud
(say, rising insurance rates) would be felt there. Ontario is
therefore not interested in its law applying in Neumeier, since the
host is from New York. 52 Avoiding fraud concerning New York
insurance contracts is New York's business.
What about New York negligence law then? The purposes
standing behind that law are deterring negligence by hosts and
compensating guests they harm. 53 The deterrence purpose is
conduct-regulating and so implicated only when the accident is in
New York. New York lawmakers are not interested in deterring
negligence by hosts, even New York hosts, wherever it might occur.
Deterring negligence by hosts in Ontario is Ontario's business.
That leaves New York negligence law in its loss-allocating
function. Here too New York is not interested. New York
286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
In the actual Neumeier case, the Ontario host and guest died in the accident. The action
was brought by the Ontarian's administratrix against the New Yorker's estate. Id. at 455.
51 Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284--85 (N.Y. 1963).
52 Currie, in his discussion of Babcock, agreed. CURRIE, supra note 26, at 724-25.
53 See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284 ("New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to
compensate his guest for injuries caused by his negligence cannot be doubted.").
49

50
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lawmakers do not want to ensure that any guest harmed by a
negligent host is compensated. They are interested only in
ensuring the New York guests are compensated.5 4 Compensating
Ontario guests is Ontario's business.
In Neumeier, each jurisdiction lacks an interest in extending its
law to the facts of the case, creating what appears to be a gap in
the law. The apparent solution would be for the court to create a
legal rule to fill the gap, by considering relevant Ontario and New
York regulatory policies. But that is not the approach that Currie,
who first identified the unprovided-for case, recommended. Currie
thought it was beyond the judicial competence to exercise
lawmaking power in conflicts cases, even though he ·must have
been aware that courts create legal rules to fill in gaps in other
areas oflaw. 55
As Currie saw it, the only governmental interests that can exist
are those generated when the purposes of preexisting laws are
vindicated through their application. 56 If the purposes of no
preexisting law would be vindicated, there are simply no
governmental interests to take into account. No jurisdiction "cares
what happens." 57 Freestanding governmental policies that might
recommend creating a new legal rule don't count.
Instead of allowing a court to make a new legal rule, Currie
tried to solve the puzzle of the unprovided-for case by arguing that
every court entertaining a case begins with a presumption in favor
of the application of its own law. 58 Only if there is a reason to
depart from the law of the forum should a court apply the law of
another jurisdiction. In an unprovided-for case no reason can be
found, so forum law applies. The presumption of forum law
ensures that there are no gaps in conflicts cases. Forum law fills
in anything that might be left unregulated.
54 See John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting its Own, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 173, 201-05 (1981); Robert Allen Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the
Unprovided for Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 125--26
(1973).
55 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 153-54.
56 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1050 ("Currie believed that only interests expressed in a
state's lawfully enacted rules are relevant to choice of law.").
57 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 152.
58 Id. at 183-84.
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But that· means that Currie's approach is as arbitrary as the
vested rights theory he criticized. 59 The fundamental problem
with the vested rights approach was its assumption that a
jurisdiction's law applies within its borders whether or not the
law's purposes would be vindicated. But Currie makes the same
mistake, except that now it is forum law that IS applied
mindlessly, without regard to purposes.
2. The Pro-Resident Bias. Given the inadequacy of Currie's
response, the unprovided-for case has been a focus of critics of
interest analysis. A common observation is that it arises because
interest analysts read loss-allocating rules as applying only if a
resident will benefit. This pro-resident bias improperly narrows
laws' scope, with the result that some cases fall under no
jurisdiction's law.
The critics argue that interest analysts adopt the pro-resident
bias tendentiously, in an attempt to generate the hoped-for false
conflict. 60 Once the scope of loss-allocating rules is understood
59 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Brainerd Currie's Contribution to Choice of Law: Looking
Back, Looking Forward, 65 MERCER L. REV. 501, 512 (2014) (arguing that the presumption
"makes no sense if you think about [choice of law] (as Currie thought we should) as an issue
about the scope of state laws"). In addition, we have no answer to how a court of a third
jurisdiction with adjudicative power but without any regulatory interest should deal with
the case. In this circumstance, Currie could not decide between using forum law and the
"bolder technique" of a court placing itself "in the position of Congress, and [reaching] the
decision [it thinks] Congress would reach if it were to consider the matter." A court
following the latter approach would act as a "guardian of the national interest," and
attempt to identify the "more enlightened and humane" rule. Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, supra note 46, at 778-80.
60 Often this criticism of the bias is constitutional in nature: The emphasis on benefiting
residents violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article N. Ely, supra note 54, at
191 (concluding that "an interest analyst approach to choice-of-law problems ... is
unconstitutional"); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 336 (1992) ("Choice-oflaw methods that prefer local litigants, local law, or better law are unconstitutional.").
According to these arguments, states are constitutionally obligated to extend the benefits of
their laws without discrimination on the basis of residence. This means adopting a
territorial approach similar to the First Restatement. Notice that such critics would agree
with Currie and Beale that the unprovided-for case does not create a gap in the law. The
force of the Constitution means that the law of the place of the accident applies.
Larry Kramer, following Currie, has criticized this argument, I believe effectively, by
noting that when a jurisdiction refuses to extend a loss-allocating rule to benefit a nonresident, it can do so as a means of permitting the law of the non-resident's jurisdiction to
be used. For example, when a court refuses to extend Georgia's interspousal immunity
statute to a California married couple that gets into an accident in Georgia, it does so as a
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more broadly, such that they can burden as well as benefit
residents, the result is not merely that the unprovided-for case
disappears. True conflicts proliferate.
For an example of how the pro-resident bias puts a thumb on
the scales in favor of false conflicts, consider Hurtado v. Superior
Court. 61 A family from the Mexican state of Zacatecas sued a
Californian in California state court for wrongful death concerning
a California accident in which a Zacatecan was killed. 62 Zacatecan
law had a limitation on the amount of damages for wrongful death;
California law allowed unlimited damages.63
The California Supreme Court concluded that the case was a
false conflict. 64 The Zacatecan limitation was a loss-allocating rule
intended by Zacatecan lawmakers to protect against "exaggerated
claims." 65 It followed from the pro-resident bias that the limitation
applied only to Zacatecan defendants, because only then would it
benefit Zacatecans. The limitation therefore did not apply in
Hurtado, because the defendant was from California. 66 On the
other hand, California law did apply. Of course, California's
unlimited damages rule did not apply in its loss-allocating
function. As a means of ensuring adequate compensation to
plaintiffs, it applied only when the plaintiff was a Californian. In
Hurtado the plaintiff was from Zacatecas. But the court concluded
that the rule was also conduct-regulating. 67 It was intended, in

means of allowing California law to apply. It is true that the California defendant is denied
a benefit that would be given to a Georgia defendant. But this is to allow California to
vindicate its regulatory purposes concerning California couples. That is miles away from
the usual form of invidious discrimination against non-residents that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was intended to prohibit. Reading the Clause as requiring Georgia to
extend its interspousal immunity law to the California defendant (and thus to frustrate
California regulatory purposes) would be perverse, for it would create the very sort of
interstate friction that the Clause was meant to prevent. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1065-72.
This helps explain why courts have not discussed, much less accepted, the critics' argument.
See, e.g., Skahill v. Capital Airlines, 234 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). For further
discussion of Kramer's position, see infra note 78.
61 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974).
6 2 Id. at 668.
63 Id.
6 4 Id. at 674.
65 Id. at 670.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 672.
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part, to maximize the deterrence of tortious conduct. 68 California
was therefore interested in the law applying, because the tortious
conduct at issue occurred in California.
Once interest analysis loses its pro-resident bias, Hurtado
becomes a true conflict. If Zacatecan lawmakers enacted their
limitation not just to protect Zacatecan defendants from being
subject to exaggerated claims, but also to prevent Zacatecan
plaintiffs from making such claims, the limitation would apply. 69
Furthermore, if California's unlimited damages rule in its lossallocating function ensures that California defendants adequately
compensate those harmed by their negligence, in addition to
ensuring that California plaintiffs are adequately compensated, it
too would apply.7o
The unprovided-for case is useful for criticizing the pro-resident
bias, because in the unprovided-for case the loss-allocating rule of
the plaintiffs residence benefits the defendant, by barring or
limiting liability, and the loss-allocating rule of the defendant's
residence benefits the plaintiff, by being pro-recovery. The bias
forces a court to conclude that neither rule applies. In addition, in
an unprovided-for case no jurisdiction has a conduct-regulating
interest. To avoid the conclusion that no jurisdiction's law applies,
the critics argue, one must read loss-allocating rules as both
benefiting and burdening residents, 71 with a resulting increase in
the number of true conflicts. 72
68

Id.

Cf. Erny v. Estate of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 1211 (N.J. 2002) (attributing to New York
a loss-allocating policy of requiring negligent New Yorkers to compensate those they harm,
even when the accident occurs outside the state and the plaintiff is not a New Yorker);
Kaiser-Georgetown Cmty. Health Plan, Inc. v. Stutsman, 491 A.2d 502, 509-10 (D.C. 1985)
(finding that D.C. has an interest in holding D.C. corporations responsible for compensating
those harmed by their negligence, even when wrongdoing was in Virginia and plaintiff was
a Virginian).
7° Conduct-regulating rules can also be read more broadly.
New York negligence law
might be understood as intended to deter not merely negligent conduct within the state, but
also negligent conduct by New Yorkers in other states. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1220 (New York is
interested in its negligence law being used for New Yorkers driving in other states as a
means of encouraging them to drive safely there).
n Indeed, some argue, why limit the scope of a loss-allocating rule on the basis of
residence at all? Why not extend it to loss-causing conduct in the jurisdiction, whatever the
residence of the parties? See Joseph William Singer, Justice and the Conflict of Laws, 48
MERCER L. REV. 831, 832 (1997) (stating that the "place of the injury has the legitimate
69
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But is the pro-resident bias really as important to interest
analysis as these critics make it out to be? With respect to many
loss-allocating rules, the issue is not whether the rule will benefit a
resident, but some other consideration that suggests that the rule
applies only to residents. For example, the reason that Ontario's
guest statute applied only to Ontario hosts and not to Ontario
guests in Neumeier was not because that is when Ontarians would
benefit from the statute. The purpose of the statute was to
prevent the guest and host from bringing a collusive suit in order
to defraud the host's insurance company.73 The statute applied
only to Ontario hosts because that is when the consequences of a
collusive suit-such as increased insurance rates-would most
likely be felt in the province. Indeed, the statute arguably
disadvantaged the Ontario hosts to whom it applied. If the suits
really were collusive, the guests would presumably have shared
the proceeds with the hosts had the suits been allowed to continue.
In addition, even when the scope of a loss-allocating rule is
genuinely limited only to cases in which it benefits residents, it is
not clear that this is the result of impermissible bias. Such a
limitation on scope can be understood as a form of deference to the

power and obligation to ensure that there is a remedy for the infringement of the plaintiff's
right to bodily security" regardless of residence); Donald T. Trautman, Two Views on Kell v.
Henderson· A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 467 (1967) (place of injury can have a
compensatory interest concerning non-residents); Singer, supra note 40, at 37-39, 97 (place
of injury has moral interest in compensation to non-residents); Aaron D. Twerski,
Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Caver:;: The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV.
373, 382-85 (1971) (because tort laws embody "moral judgments" a court should not assume
that legislators intended to confine their benefits to residents).
72 The conclusions drawn from the proliferation of true conflicts are varied.
Joseph
William Singer has recommended, for example, that courts embrace a normative approach,
in which choice of the better law plays a more substantial role. Joseph William Singer,
Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and Fairness in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1923; Singer, supra note 40, at 6. Others recommend that courts give up answering
conflicts cases on the basis of governmental interests entirely and return to a more
territorial approach like the First Restatement. Twerski, supra note 71, at 373, 382. This
recommendation arguably has been followed by the minority of jurisdictions that have
retained vested rights theory, for they have done so, in part, because they find that if
governmental interest are read broadly, irreconcilable true conflicts abound. See, e.g.,
McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662, 664--65 (Va. 1979) (criticizing "uncertainty and
confusion" of interest analysis approaches).
73 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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regulatory interests of other jurisdictions. 74 For example, the
reason Zacatecan lawmakers do not protect Californian defendants
sued by Zacatecan plaintiffs from excessive demands for
compensation might be because they think that the appropriate
protection of such California defendants should be left to
California lawmakers. So understood, reading the scope of lossallocating rules to benefit residents is a comity-enabling
presumption, not a bias.7 5

Ill. KRAMER'S ''MYTH" OF THE UNPROVIDED- FOR CASE
But even if the pro-resident bias is reinterpreted as a comityenabling presumption, the critics still seem right that it should be
abandoned in the unprovided-for case. The facts in Neumeier
appear to fall under neither Ontario nor New York law only
because the pro-resident presumption leads us to conclude that
each jurisdiction is deferring to what it assumes are the greater
regulatory interests of the other. Since neither Ontario nor New
York has such a greater regulatory interest, the presumption
should be abandoned.
New York should be understood as
extending its negligence law to New York hosts, as a means of
compelling them to make whole all the guests they harm. And
Ontario should be understood as extending its guest statute to
Ontario guests, to discourage them from participating in a possibly
collusive lawsuit. The result would be that the case is an evenlybalanced true conflict-both Ontario and New York law apply.
Courts would come to similar conclusions in other unprovided-for
cases. They would end up as true conflicts.
But Larry Kramer offers a different solution to the unprovidedfor case. As he sees it, there is no reason to abandon the proresident presumption. The reason is that one jurisdiction always
has a neglected law that supports governmental interests to which
the other jurisdiction should defer. The unprovided-for case is
really a false conflict.
See supra note 60.
Larry Kramer largely retains the pro-resident presumption on these grounds. Kramer,
supra note 2, at 1067. But see part IV.B, infra, for a discussion of an area where Kramer
inconsistently departs from the presumption.
74

75
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A. AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE CASES

As the critics see it, Ontario's only interest in Neumeier is the
relatjve weak one that results from a broader reading of its guest
statute's scope. Its only interest is in ensuring that Ontario guests
do not participate in a possibly collusive suit, even though such a
suit will have most of its negative effects in New York. But is that
really Ontario's sole interest? Neumeier involved a negligent host
in Ontario causing an accident in which an Ontario guest was
harmed. Wouldn't Ontario lawmakers want compensation to the
Ontario guest and deterrence of negligence by hosts in Ontario? It
is true that Ontario legislators concluded that compensation and
deterrence are not as important as worries about insurance fraud.
That's why they enacted the guest statute. But they were thinking
about cases where the host is from Ontario, such that the
consequences of the fraud would be felt there. When the host is a
New Yorker, wouldn't the importance of compensation and
deterrence rise to the fore?
One might argue that the problem with such a solution is that
Ontario has no law supporting these interests in compensation
and deterrence in guest-host cases.
And the only relevant
governmental interests that interest analysts recognize are those
that stand behind preexisting laws. There appears to be no
Ontario law allowing guests to sue hosts for negligence because, as
interest analysts like Currie see it, the Ontario guest statute
removed all possibilities of a guest suing a host for negligence
under Ontario law. But Kramer argues that this is a mistake.
The extent to which the guest statute displaced Ontario negligence
law in guest-host suits, he argues, must be read in the light of the
guest statute's purpose. Since it follows from its purpose that it
extends only to cases in which the host is from Ontario, the statute
displaces Ontario negligence law only in such cases. 76 Ontario
negligence law still applies to guest-host suits in which the host is
not from Ontario. 77 It follows, therefore, that a court facing the

Kramer, supra note 2, at 1059-60.
Or rather, Ontario negligence law applies to such suits provided that the compensatory
or deterrent purposes of Ontario negligence law would be advanced, namely when the guest
is an Ontarian or the accident happened in Ontario. Both of these are the case in Neumeier.
76

77
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facts in Neumeier should allow the Ontario guest to recover under
this preexisting Ontario negligence law. 78 Kramer is able to turn
Neumeier into a false conflict while satisfying the demand that
only preexisting laws can be used in conflicts cases.
There is an undeniable logic to Kramer's argument. If, as
Currie would insist, the scope of the guest statute should be read
in the light of its purpose, why shouldn't the manner in which the
guest statute displaces Ontario negligence law be read in the light
of the guest statute's purpose?
Kramer employs the same solution to a hypothetical
unprovided-for case, originally discussed by Currie.
(This
hypothetical is a variation on an actual case, Grant u. McAuliffe. 79)
In the hypothetical, a Californian negligently causes an accident in
Arizona in which an Arizonan is injured. 80 The Californian
subsequently dies of his injuries. The Arizonan then sues the
Californian's estate for negligence. Arizona has retained the
common law rule that a negligence action abates upon the death of
78 This is Kramer's solution to the unprovided-for case if one does not take into account
the effect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Clause has been interpreted as
putting on states a "norm of comity" that prohibits them from discriminating against nonresidents simply because they are from outside the state. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420
U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975). Kramer argues persuasively that it does not violate the Clause for
Georgia to decline to extend its loss-allocating interspousal immunity rule to a California
couple who get into an accident in Georgia, even if the result is that the California
defendant-wife is disadvantaged. See supra note 60. In such a false conflict, Georgia is
yielding to California interests, thereby reducing the friction that the Clause was intended
to prevent. But (assuming that Ontario is subject to the Clause), he argues that it would
violate the Clause for an Ontario court to use only its negligence law in Neumeier, without
the affirmative defense, thereby disadvantaging the New York defendant. In that case, it
cannot be understood as yielding to New York interests, because New York has no interest
in its law applying to the case. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1072-74. The Clause therefore
compels Ontario to extend its guest statute to the facts in Neumeier. For a criticism of
Kramer's po,sition on the effect of the Clause, see Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 2520-25. For
my part, I think worries about the Clause must be fundamentally reformulated once we
recognize that New York has an interest in a rule barring liability being used. See
Conclusion, infra. I hope to pursue these matters in another article.
79 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
80 In the original Grant case, the parties were both Californians and the accident was in
Arizona. Currie described this case as a false conflict. Only California has an interest. The
California Supreme Court, in a sense, agreed, for it used California law. But rather than
relying on interest analysis it argued disingenuously that the abatement rule was
procedural. Grant, 264 P.2d at 948; Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A
House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 468 (1985); CURRIE, supra note 26, at
152; Kramer, supra note 2, at 1054-55.
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the tortfeasor. California has abrogated its abatement rule by
statute. 81
The purpose behind Arizona's abatement rule is the unfairness
of compromising the property interests of the beneficiaries of an
estate due to the wrongdoing of the deceased. The beneficiaries,
after all, did no wrong themselves. 82 Arizona is not interested,
however, in this rule applying, because the estate to be protected
is Californian. 83
The purpose behind California law, in which an estate can be
sued for the negligence of the decedent, is compensation to the
plaintiff. 84 California isn't interested in its law applying, because
the plaintiff to be compensated is from Arizona. 85 Since neither
jurisdiction's law applies, Currie argued that a court should use
forum law. 86
Under Kramer's analysis, the Grant variation is a false conflict.
Arizona negligence law without the abatement rule applies. 87 The
abatement rule is an affirmative defense to an otherwise available
negligence action. Because the abatement rule is intended to
protect Arizona estates, it displaces Arizona negligence law only in
suits against such estates. Since the estate is Californian in the
Grant variation, the plaintiff is free to sue under Arizona
negligence law.
B. NO-CAUSE-OF-ACTION CASES

So far, Kramer has addressed two unprovided-for cases. In each,
an affirmative defense that would otherwise bar the plaintiff's
action is inapplicable on conflicts grounds. But what happens when
81 CAL. Crv. CODE § 956 (repealed 1961).
The rule is now in California's code of civil
procedure. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE§ 377.20.
82 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 144; Kramer, supra note 2, at 1048-49. Kramer questions
whether this account is accurate, id. at 1048-49 n.21, but that need not concern us here.
83 Arizona might still be interested if the beneficiaries of the California estate were
Arizona residents. But in the Grant variation, they are Californians.
84 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1049. It arguably also exists to deter negligent conduct, but
any added deterrent effect due to one's beneficiaries' not receiving their inheritance after
one's death is probably minimal.
85 CURRIE, supra note 26, at 144-45.
86 Id. at 156, 168.
8 7 Again, this solution ignores the effect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
See
supra note 78.
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the plaintiffs action is barred, not through an affirmative defense,
but by the absence of a cause of action for relief?
Kramer's example of an unprovided-for case of this no-cause-ofaction variety is Erwin v. Thomas. 88
Erwin, a Washington
resident, was harmed in Washington by Thomas, an Oregon
resident. Erwin's wife sued Thomas in Oregon state court for loss
of consortium. Washington had retained the common law (and
now unconstitutional) rule that only husbands can sue for loss of
consortium. Oregon had abrogated the rule by statute.
The Oregon Supreme Court treated the case as unprovided-for.
As the court saw it, Washington law protects Washington
defendants against loss of consortium actions by married women.
It is therefore inapplicable in cases in which the defendant is from
Oregon. 89
But, the court concluded, Oregon law also is
90
inapplicable.
Because Oregon law exists to ensure adequate
compensation to Oregon married women (and, perhaps, to
maximize deterrence of negligence in Oregon), it does not apply
when the plaintiff is from Washington and the accident occurred
there. 91 Following Currie's recommendation, the court used forum
(that is, Oregon) law and allowed the Washington wife to recover. 92
The Oregon Supreme Court appeared to treat the Washington
bar on loss of consortium actions by wives as if it were a
defendant-protective affirmative defense to a general rule of
liability. So understood, Kramer's response would be the same as
in Neumeier and the Grant variation. Because the defense does
not apply, the Washington plaintiff should be free to sue under
Washington negligence law.
But Kramer argues that the
plaintiffs action in Erwin should instead be dismissed under
Washington law for failure to state a claim.
The reason
Washington law does not provide married women with a cause of
action for loss of consortium is because Washington lawmakers do
not consider compensation to be appropriate at all:

88

506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973).

89

Id. at 496--97.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 496--97.

9o

91

92

Kramer, supra note 2, at 1063.
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A husband could recover for loss of consortium at
common law, because the defendant's negligence
deprived him of services his wife owed him by law. A
wife could not make a similar claim when her husband
was injured, because her husband did not owe her
similar services. Thus, a wife's claim for loss of
consortium does not fail because her interest in being
compensated is subordinated to some interest of the
defendant. It fails because she is not deemed to have
suffered any injury.93
Because Washington lawmakers do not consider a wife's loss of
consortium to be a compensable injury, they would want the
Washington wife in Erwin to be denied relief. She fails to state a
claim under Washington law.
To sum up, there are two types of unprovided-for case. Under
cases of the first type, the law of the plaintiffs residence has an
affirmative defense barring an otherwise applicable cause of action
for recovery. The solution is that the inapplicability of the
affirmative defense on conflicts grounds leaves the plaintiff free to
recover. There is no gap in the law. The plaintiff has a cause of
action under the law of her residence.
Under cases of the second type, the law of the plaintiffs
residence bars her action because it has no cause of action for
recovery at all. The solution here is that the plaintiff fails to state
a claim under her law. Again, there is no gap. The unprovided-for
case is a "myth."
IV. THE MYTH OF THE MYTH
Kramer's solution to the unprovided-for case is ingenious but
flawed. My focus will be on his solution to affirmative-defense
unprovided-for cases, where the problem is his unsustainably
93 Id. at 1062; see also Roosevelt, supra note 59, at 512 (accepting Kramer's argument);
Roosevelt, supra note 3, at 2522 (same). Once again, this is the solution without taking into
account the effect of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Kramer, supra note 2, at
1073, for a discussion of the effect of the Privileges & Immunities Clause on no-cause-ofaction unprovided-for cases. For a discussion of the effect of the Clause on affirmativedefense unprovided-for cases, see note 78 supra. I ignore this aspect of his argument here.

790

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:763

broad conception of a law. This conception generates intractable
puzzles if applied consistently. I will then briefly discuss his
solution to no-cause-of-action unprovided-for cases.
A. AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE CASES

As we have seen, Kramer argues that in Neumeier and the
Grant variation, the affirmative defense that would normally
displace the plaintiffs cause of action does not apply.9 4 That frees
the plaintiff to recover. The point is not that regulatory policies
recommend creating a law allowing the plaintiff to recover. There
already is such a law.
1. New True Conflicts. Let us take Kramer at his word. There
is preexisting Ontario law allowing negligence actions against nonOntario hosts. And there is preexisting Arizona law allowing
negligence actions against non-Arizona estates.
If these laws already exist, they exist whatever the content of the
competing jurisdiction's law. If a jurisdiction has a law on the
books, it is on the books. It doesn't appear or disappear based on
what the law of another jurisdiction says. Consider, therefore, the
Grant variation with one change. There still is an Arizona
plaintiff, a California estate, and an Arizona accident. Arizona still
has the common law abatement rule. But the twist is that
California has the abatement rule too.
Both Arizona and
California have retained the common law rule that a plaintiffs
action for negligence abates upon the death of the tortfeasor.
Kramer must characterize this case as a true conflict. As in the
Grant variation, Arizona's negligence law (minus its abatement
rule) applies. But now California also has an interest in the caseits abatement rule applies, because there is a California estate to
protect. So we have Arizona law giving the plaintiff a right of
recovery and California law barring the plaintiffs action.
But no court facing such a case would treat it as a true conflict.
It would dismiss the plaintiffs action on the ground that both
jurisdictions have law that bars the plaintiffs action. If the
plaintiff started talking about Arizona negligence law providing
him with a right of compensation against non-Arizona estates, he
94

See supra Part III.A.
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would be laughed out of court, 95 or at best interpreted as asking
the court to recognize a new and highly problematic Arizona cause
of action, one that could never have been anticipated in advance of
the conflicts case.
To his credit, Kramer recognizes this problem and offers a
response (albeit briefly and in a footnote):
[T]he justification for Arizona to limit its abatement
rule to Arizona estates is to leave other states free to
regulate their estates as they see fit. But it would
hardly be reasonable for Arizona to withhold the
benefit of its abatement rule in deference to the law of
the defendant's home state and then to ignore that
state's law. Failure to recognize either Arizona's or
California's abatement rule would thus be inconsistent
with the premise for limiting the application of
Arizona law in the first place.96
One problem with this argument is that it fails to capture why
an appeal to Arizona negligence law would be considered
inappropriate. If the plaintiff said Arizona negligence law allowed
him to sue non-Arizona estates, the court would say that no such
law exists. It would not say that the law exists but is barred by
California's abatement rule.
But, more fundamentally, it is hard to see how Kramer's
argument is responsive to the problem at all. It is indeed true that
Arizona limits its abatement rule to Arizona estates to leave other
states to regulate their estates as they see fit. 97 In the Grant
variation, it gives the matter over to California. And California
has chosen to act, by creating an abatement rule. But that simply
means there is a true conflict. Deference to California's interests
gives Arizona a reason not to extend its abatement rule to the
facts. It does not give Arizona a reason not to extend its negligence
9 5 One reason that the court would reject such a law is that it violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. The law discriminates on the basis of the residence of the parties. But
even in the absence of the Clause, no court would recognize the law's existence, because no
one could have anticipated it in advance of the conflicts case.
96 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1054-55 n.34.
97 See id. at 1054.

792

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:763

law to the facts. As Kramer himself argues, Arizona is interested
in its negligence law applying because there is an Arizona plaintiff
who deserves compensation. 98 How can the fact that Arizona has
left the regulation of California estates to California mean that it
has to prefer California's regulation of those estates to its own
regulation of Arizona plaintiffs?
The idea behind Kramer's
argument appears to be that if both Arizona's negligence law and
California's abatement rule apply, the case is not a true conflict,
but rather a case in which a cause of action (Arizona's) has been
defeated by an affirmative defense (California's). But that simply
means Kramer has assumed-without argument-that California
interests defeat Arizona interests.99
I think the conclusion is inescapable: If Arizona really has a law
allowing negligence actions against non-Arizona estates, then it has
that law no matter the content of another jurisdiction's law. That
means recognizing ''laws" that no one would ever say exist-in part
because they would frustrate the expectations of the parties.
We can now appreciate the attractions of Currie's approach,
under which Arizona's abatement rule completely displaces
negligence actions against estates.l 0° For Currie, there simply is
no Arizona negligence action against a California estate. Thus, we
do not have to worry about an Arizona plaintiff asserting such a
98 See id. (stating that "Arizona gives a right to recover to plaintiffs injured by negligent
defendants" when the plaintiff is "from Arizona").
99 There is another problem with Kramer's argument. If he has solved the puzzle of a
case in which both Arizona and California have abatement rules, he has done so only at the
cost of making the original Grant variation an unprovided-for case again. In connection
with that case, Kramer said that Arizona's negligence law gives the plaintiff relief. Arizona
negligence law applies because the plaintiff is an Arizonan, and its abatement rule does not
apply because the decedent is a Californian. That was the end of the story. Now things are
more complicated. We cannot yet say whether the plaintiff can recover, because Arizona
gives over to California law the question of whether an abatement rule is available. The
problem is that California has no interest in its answer to that question being used in the
Grant variation. California does not have an abatement rule because it prefers the
compensatory interest of the plaintiff. But in the Grant variation, California has no
compensatory interest because the plaintiff is not from California. So we are back to an
unprovided-for case. Previously, the unprovided-for case was put this way: Arizona was not
interested in its abatement rule applying, and California was not interested in its
negligence law applying. Now, the problem should be put this way: Arizona is not
interested in its abatement rule applying, and California is not interested in its reason not
to have an abatement rule applying.
1oo See Part liLA supra.
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cause of action when both Arizona and California have abatement
rules. But, as we have seen, Currie's approach violates the core
thesis of interest analysis-that the scope of a law should be read
in the light of its purposes. The scope of Arizona's abatement rule
is read formalistically, not purposively.
The rule displaces
negligence liability against an estate even in cases in which
Arizona has no interest in its doing so.
Interest analysts therefore appear to face a dilemma. On the
one hand, they can stick to the core thesis of interest analysis and
understand the conflicts scope of an affirmative defense in the
light of its purposes, with the uncomfortable result that laws exist
whose application would upset the reasonable expectations of the
parties. This is the path Kramer takes. On the other hand, they
can abandon the core thesis of interest analysis and protect the
reasonable expectations of the parties. This is Currie's approach.
Interest analysts face this dilemma because they are committed
to the view that laws have a scope in conflicts cases-that they can
actually apply to the facts. This forces them to take a stand on
how the conflicts scope of an affirmative defense should be readformalistically, as Currie argues, or purposively, as Kramer
argues. But why think that Arizona negligence law and the
Arizona abatement rule have any scope in a conflicts case? When
Arizona lawmakers came up with these laws, they were thinking
of an all-Arizona case. In such a case, protecting the blameless
beneficiaries of an Arizona estate was considered more important
than compensation to an Arizona plaintiff.
Arizona law
effectuating this balancing of interests is inapplicable to the facts
of the Grant variation, for there are no beneficiaries of an Arizona
estate to protect.
One must figure out what law Arizona
lawmakers would want to be created for the case.
Once one understands law as made rather than applied in the
Grant variation, a court is free to consider both regulatory policies
and concerns about the expectations of the parties.
True,
Arizona's interest in compensation to an Arizona plaintiff
recommends a negligence rule. But would the beneficiaries of the
California estate be unfairly surprised by such a rule? In the
Grant variation, the answer is no, because they would be similarly
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exposed in an all-California case. So an Arizona negligence rule
can be created for the case.l 01 But party expectations are a
problem if California also has an abatement rule. For that reason,
it might be advisable (or even constitutionally obligatory on due
process grounds) to create an abatement rule for the case, Arizona
regulatory interests notwithstanding. 102
Kramer, by contrast, cannot take party expectations into
account in this way, because he thinks an Arizona law allowing
negligence actions against California estates already exists. If it
already exists, party expectations should conform to it, rather than
the other way around.
2. Rump Laws. One can describe the laws that Kramer argues
apply in Neumeier and the Grant variation as rump laws. Instead
of Ontario's guest statute's completely displacing negligence
actions in guest-host cases, the guest statute displaces such
actions only when the host is from Ontario. A rump Ontario
negligence action in guest-host cases remains to be applied in
Neumeier. A similar Arizona rump law applies in the Grant
variation.
Kramer finds rump laws useful in Neumeier and the Grant
variation. But his approach produces other rump laws that he
would find less congenial. If reading affirmative defenses in the
light of their purposes generates rump laws, rump laws should
also be generated when a law is repealed.
Consider California's abrogation of its common law abatement
rule in 1949.
When California had an abatement rule, it
101 I am not taking into account here the effect of any constitutional restrictions. It is
likely that the creation of an Arizona negligence law for the Grant variation is prohibited
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, because Arizona law discriminates on the
basis of the residence of the parties. The proper rule to create, given the Clause, would
arguably be one that takes into account all relevant state interests. This would include
California's interest in protecting the blameless beneficiaries of a California estate. See
Conclusion, infra (describing such an approach).
102 There is nothing unusual about party expectations trumping regulatory policies when
creating new common law rules. This occurs, for example, when federal courts create
federal common law. Sometimes the content of the federal rule is borrowed from state law,
because party expectations have coalesced around the state law standard. This can happen
even if federal regulatory policies, narrowly construed, recommend a different rule. Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1991); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 958-59 (1986) (offering DeSylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), as an example).
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presumably served the same purpose as Arizona's: protecting the
property interests of the blameless beneficiaries of an estate. It
applied, therefore, only in cases where the decedent was a
Californian. When California lawmakers abrogated the rule, their
purpose, we can assume, was vindicating the compensatory
interests of plaintiffs. By Kramer's reasoning, therefore, the
abatement rule was abrogated only for cases where the plaintiff is
a Californian. A rump abatement rule still exists for cases (like
the Grant variation) with a California estate and a foreign
plaintiff.
Such cases are within the scope of the original
abatement rule and yet not within the scope of the abrogating
statute. In short, Kramer should have characterized the Grant
variation as a true conflict. Arizona's rump negligence law
applies, and California's rump abatement rule applies.
The fact that interest analysis, if applied consistently to
repeals, would generate rump laws has been observed by Lea
Brilmayer-although she does not notice that rump laws would
also arise when laws are limited through affirmative defenses. 103
As she puts it, the notion that a repeal of a law leaves a rump law
in place is "absurd." 104 Interest analysts "would agree that the
territorial reach of the repeal must be identical to the territorial
reach of the original statute." 105 To avoid the problem of rump
laws, she argues, the conflicts scope of a repeal must be read
formalistically. But if that's so, she asks, why not read the
conflicts scope of the law that is repealed formalistically too? 106 If
1oa Brilmayer, supra note 42, at 417-20.
104 Id. at 418.
She does not say why, but the reason is probably the frustration of the
expectations of the parties if the existence of such a law were taken seriously.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 420. To my knowledge, the only writer to have responded to Brilmayer's challenge
is Herma Hill Kay. (The example Kay discusses is a jurisdiction's repeal of a guest statute.)
Kay argues that the repeal would not leave a rump guest statute in place, because the repeal
was the repudiation of worries about fraud entirely: ''If a state changes the content of its
domestic tort law respecting the recovery of guests against hosts, no remnant of an earlier
protectionist policy for hosts survives to be resurrected in a conflicts suit by a nonresident
passenger against a local driver." Herma Hill Kay, Testing the Modern Critics against Moffatt
Hancock's Choice of Law Theories, 73 CAL. L. REV. 525, 539-40 (1985).
Kay is quite right that if the repeal is understood as disclaiming any worry about fraud
in guest-host suits, we have no reason to think that a rump guest statute remains. But the
question remains why we should read the repeal in the manner she suggests. Ontario
repealed its guest statute in 1977. Ont. Stat. ch. 54, § 16 (1977). Why read this as the
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the conflicts scope of the repeal of the abatement rule is not read
in the light of its purposes, why read the conflicts scope of the
abatement rule itself in the light of its purposes?
Brilmayer confronts interest analysts with the same dilemma I
discussed earlier: (1) read the conflicts scope of law B, which limits
law A, in the light of law B's purposes and accept that a rump of
law A remains, or (2) read the conflicts scope of law B
formalistically and violate the core thesis of interest analysis. But,
to repeat, there is a third option. The dilemma does not arise if A
and B do not apply in conflicts cases at all. If California's
abatement rule has no conflicts scope, we don't have to speculate
about the conflicts scope of its repeal.
Once we stop thinking of rump laws as laws, we can appreciate
them for what they really are: freestanding regulatory policies that
recommend the creation of a new law for conflicts cases. So
understood, rump laws are no longer absurd, but reveal very
important truths. When Arizona's abatement rule was created,
Arizona kept the policy of compensating harmed Arizonans. This
policy did not disappear simply because it was overridden by
concerns about fairness to the beneficiaries of Arizona estates.
Because it did not disappear, it can recommend the creation of a
rule of negligence liability in the Grant variation, where concerns
about fairness to the beneficiaries of Arizona estates are
irrelevant. By the same token, when California abrogated its
abatement rule, its worries about fairness to the beneficiaries of
California estates remained. This policy did not disappear simply
because it was overridden by the desire to compensate harmed
Californians. Because it did not disappear, it can recommend an
abatement rule for the facts of the Grant variation, where concerns
about compensating harmed Californians are irrelevant.
3. Formalism. There is yet another problem with Kramer's
solution to affirmative-defense unprovided-for cases. Too much
repudiation of concerns about fraud in guest-host suits? Kay herself would admit that
Ontario lawmakers are still concerned about collusive suits. There are other Ontario laws
that sanction or discourage it. Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1990 c. !.8 (Ont.). Are we really to
believe that Ontario lawmakers, despite expressing a concern about insurance fraud in
other areas of Ontario law, and thinking in the past that preventing such fraud was more
important than compensation and deterrence in guest-host cases, now have absolutely no
concern about fraud in such cases? I cannot see how that can possibly be true.
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rests on legal form. As Kramer describes it, if there is an
affirmative defense blocking the plaintiff's recovery, the defense is
inapplicable on conflicts grounds and the plaintiff's action can
proceed.l 07 If the plaintiff's recovery is blocked by the absence of a
cause of action for relief, by contrast, the plaintiff fails to state a
claim and his action is dismissed.
This will not do. Imagine that Ontario legislators still think
that worries about insurance fraud are more important than
compensation and deterrence in guest-host cases. But instead of
making the presence of a guest-host relationship an affirmative
defense to a negligence suit, they decide to make the absence of a
guest-host relationship an element of a cause of action for
negligence. Kramer's formalism would apparently force him to say
that an Ontario guest in a case like Neumeier (with a New York
host and Ontario accident) now cannot recover. The case would
have to be treated like Erwin. The plaintiff's action would be
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Ontario law.
But it should not matter to the analysis what form Ontario
legislators chose to block guest-host suits, provided that they think
that compensation to guests and deterrence of negligence by hosts
are worthy goals, albeit goals that are less important than
avoiding insurance fraud in an all-Ontario case. When Ontario
lawmakers were choosing between redefining a negligence action
and creating an affirmative defense, they were not thinking of the
consequences of their choice for conflicts cases. They were focused
on an all-Ontario case, where the distinction made a difference
only to pleading and proof.
To avoid such arbitrary results, Kramer would have to amend
his argument to make the choice of legal form irrelevant. What is
important is whether Ontario lawmakers, if asked, would say that
Ontario has deterrence and compensatory policies that recommend
liability of negligent hosts to guests. If they would say this, the
plaintiff should be allowed to recover in Neumeier.
But that means that it does not really matter in Neumeier
whether one can point to a preexisting Ontario law allowing
negligence actions against hosts. If no such law can be found, an

101

See supra Part liLA.
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appropriate Ontario negligence law must be createdJ08 And with
that he has abandoned the view that only interests supported by
preexisting laws count. The consequences for interest analysis if
this position is abandoned are, as we shall later see, catastrophic.l 09
B. NO-CAUSE-OF-ACTION CASES

Let us now briefly turn to Kramer's argument concernmg nocause-of-action unprovided-for cases. To repeat, Kramer argues
that in these cases the plaintiffs action should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim under the law of the plaintiffs residence.l 10
The wife in Erwin fails to state a claim under Washington law.
The case is a false conflict.
One problem with this solution is formalism again: Kramer relies
too much on the fact that the plaintiffs action is blocked through
the definition of a cause of action, rather than an affirmative
defense. Assume that Ontario legislators see no purpose to
compensation and deterrence in guest-host suits, not even a purpose
that is trumped by worries about fraud. The special circumstances
of guest-host suits make compensation and deterrence entirely
inappropriate. Perhaps the guest, by demanding compensation, is
ws AB Kramer has put it to me privately, even if there is no Ontario law allowing guests to
sue hosts for negligence, the policies of Ontario lawmakers can show whether there is a
legal right to compensation in guest-host negligence cases. Thus, Kramer would argue that
this hypothetical Ontario negligence cause of action (which includes the absence of a guesthost relationship as an element) really consists of two legal rights: a right of plaintiffs to
compensation from all negligent defendants (even hosts), and an immunity right barring
negligence actions if the defendant is a host. The immunity right trumps the compensatory
right in an all-Ontario case. When the plaintiff-guest is an Ontarian and the defendanthost a New Yorker, however, the compensatory right extends to the facts, and the immunity
right does not.
I would begin by noting that, in his article, Kramer speaks of there being no legal right
without enacted law establishing it. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1064. In any event, I see no
work that is being performed by the term "legal right" here. What Kramer is really doing is
pointing to freestanding regulatory policies that recommend creating a new law for the facts in
Neumeier. Kramer can speak of an Ontario "legal right" of an Ontario guest to compensation
if he wants, but only if he also acknowledges a New York "legal right" of a New York host to
have actions against him barred due to worries about fraud. See Conclusion, infra. Neumeier
involves a true conflict between these two "legal rights." In both cases, the source of the
putative legal right is the same-policies that are not supported by applicable law but that
recommend the creation of a law for the facts of a conflicts case.
109 See Conclusion, infra.
no See supra Part III.B.
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biting the hand that feeds him and simple self-interest (and worries
about liability to third parties) will provide all the deterrence of
negligence that the host needs.l 11 Their response might be to
redefine a negligence action, such that guest-host suits are not
allowed. But they might instead pass a guest statute. Which
approach they choose should not make a difference to Kramer's
conclusion that the plaintiffs action should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim in a case, like Neumeier, with an Ontario plaintiff, a
New York defendant, and a New York accident.
But there is an even more significant problem with Kramer's
solution to the no-cause-of-action unprovided-for case. It assumes
that the loss-allocating rule of the plaintiffs residence burdens the
plaintiff. It is for this reason that the Washington wife fails to state
a claim under Washington law in Erwin. This is contrary to the
pro-resident presumption, which Kramer employs elsewhere,l1 2
I think that part of the problem is that in Erwin, there is a
particular reason why Washington would want its loss-allocating
rule to burden Washington wife-plaintiffs. The justification for
Washington's rule is that a wife has no right to the sexual services
of her husband. When her husband has been rendered unable to
provide those services, the wife has not lost anything to which she
was legally entitled. She therefore deserves no compensation.
Given this justification, Washington lawmakers would want the
rule to apply to Washington wife-plaintiffs, because Washington,
being the location of the marital domicile, has regulatory power
over who in the relationship has a legal right to sexual services
from whom.
Furthermore, Washington lawmakers would not want the rule
to protect Washington defendants. If an Oregon wife sued a
Washingtonian for loss of consortium due to an accident in Oregon,
the case would be a false conflict, not a true one. Washington
lawmakers would not want their rule to apply, because they leave
to Oregon lawmakers the determination of whether an Oregon
wife has lost something compensable. This is very different from
most loss-allocating rules blocking or limiting liability, like the
111 These are not implausible positions.
See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 42, at 1256
(concluding that liability is not necessary to deter negligence of hosts to guests in car).
n2 Kramer, supra note 2, at 1054-55.
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damages limitation in Hurtado, where there is no special reason to
think that the rule is intended solely to burden resident plaintiffs.
It should either be read as benefiting resident defendants, in
keeping with the pro-resident presumption, or as burdening
resident plaintiffs and benefiting resident defendants equally, as
the critics of interest analysis argue.
To adequately assess Kramer's solution to no-cause-of-action
unprovided-for cases, therefore, we need to consider a case without
the special reason in Erwin to extend the loss-allocating rule of the
plaintiffs residence only to resident plaintiffs. An example would
be an unprovided-for version of Hurtado.l 13 To repeat, in the
original Hurtado case, a family from Zacatecas sued a Californian
for wrongful death due to an accident in California in which a
Zacatecan was killed. Zacatecan law had a limit on the amount of
damages for wrongful death (which was apparently part of the
cause of action, not an affirmative defense); California law had no
such limit. To make the case unprovided-for, we need to keep the
residence of the parties the same but move the location of the
accident to Zacatecas.
Normally an interest analyst, using the pro-resident
presumption, would argue that both jurisdictions lack an interest in
the question of compensation above the Zacatecan limit. California
lawmakers are not interested in ensuring that Zacatecans are fully
compensated. And Zacatecan lawmakers are not interested in
protecting Californians against "exaggerated claims." 114
If Kramer were to follow his argument in Erwin, he would say
that the Zacatecan limit applies. Because the Zacatecan plaintiffs
failed to state a claim for damages beyond the limit, Zacatecan law
denies them relief. Zacatecan lawmakers are not just interested in
protecting Zacatecans against paying excessive compensationthey are also interested in making sure that Zacatecans do not
demand excessive compensation. Again, there is no unprovided-for
case. The case is a false conflict in which Zacatecan law applies.
So understood, Kramer's solution to no-cause-of-action
unprovided-for cases is puzzling. His argument is similar to the

11s 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974).
114 Id. at 670.
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critics' solution to unprovided-for cases, in which loss-allocating
rules are read as burdening as well as benefiting residents. But
Kramer's abandonment of the pro-resident presumption is
strangely limited. Zacatecas is interested in burdening Zacatecan
plaintiffs with its law. But California is apparently not interested
in burdening California defendants with its law. Why not? If the
fact that a cause of action does not recognize damages can
disadvantage a resident plaintiff, why wouldn't the fact that a
cause of action does recognize damages disadvantage a resident
defendant? To be consistent, Kramer would have to characterize
the Hurtado variation as a true conflict: California's unlimited
damages rule and Zacatecas's damages limitation both apply.
What's more, if one starts reading loss-allocating causes of
action as burdening as well as benefiting residents, why not do the
same thing to loss-allocating affirmative defenses? Arizona, for
example, believes that it is inappropriate for a plaintiff to demand
compensation from the blameless beneficiaries of an estate.l 15
That's why it has an abatement rule. Why wouldn't it want this
defense to burden an Arizona plaintiff who makes demands on the
blameless beneficiaries of a California estate? The Grant variation
would turn out to be a true conflict: Arizona's abatement rule
would burden the Arizona plaintiff, and California's negligence
rule would burden the California defendant.
Kramer appears to be in a bind. To provide an answer to the
Hurtado variation, he must abandon the pro-resident
presumption. But if he does so consistently, not only does the
number of true conflicts balloon, his solution to affirmative-defense
unprovided-for cases is threatened.
V. CONCLUSION

Let us set aside Kramer's solution to no-cause-of-action
unprovided-for cases, and return to affirmative-defense
unprovided-for cases.l 16 I think it is clear that Kramer's attempt
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
I hope to discuss no-cause-of-action unprovided-for cases-and more generally, how
failure to state a claim should be treated in the conflict of laws-more fully in a separate
article.
115
116
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to find preexisting law that applies in such cases is unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, he has identified important regulatory policies that
recommend creating a new legal rule to fill the gap that the
unprovided-for case creates.
Kramer is right that Ontario
lawmakers would want a rule of negligence liability for the facts in
Neumeier. Such a rule would compensate Ontario guests and
deter negligence by hosts in Ontario. Granted, Ontario lawmakers
concluded that these policies are not as important as avoiding
insurance fraud. But they were thinking about cases where the
host is from Ontario, such that the consequences of the fraud
would be felt there. When the host is not an Ontarian, the
importance of compensation and deterrence should indeed rise to
the fore, even though there is no actual Ontario law allowing
guest-host negligence suits that supports these policies.l 17
Does that mean that a court faced with the facts of Neumeier
should allow the plaintiffs action to proceed? The problem is that
if one is allowed to look beyond preexisting laws to identify
relevant regulatory policies, there is no reason to stop with
Ontario's interests in compensation and deterrence.
For example, New York has an interest in avoiding insurance
fraud. 11 8 Granted, it does not have a guest statute. But, as we
have seen, Ontario does not have a law allowing negligence
liability in guest-host suits either. We have abandoned the dogma

117 Something like this argument has been offered by Robert Sedler.
See Sedler, supra
note 54, at 144; Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181, 235-36 (1977); see also Hans W.
Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV.
150, 167 (1973) (offering an argument similar to Sedler's). As Sedler would put it, in
Neumeier, Ontario and New York have shared policies of deterring negligent driving and
compensating those harmed by such driving. Ontario, however, has a law-the guest
statute-that deviates from the shared policies. Sedler argues that a court should decide
the case in accordance with the shared policies, because Ontario has no interest in applying
the law that deviates from them. The Ontario plaintiff should be allowed to recover.
Kramer has criticized Sedler's argument, which is similar to his own in other respects,
for talking about "state interests in the abstract," without identifying the law under which
the Ontario plaintiff recovers. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1056. As Kramer sees it, the
Ontario plaintiff recovers under Ontario negligence law. Sedler, by contrast, appears to be
suggesting that law be created to vindicate shared policies. But it is precisely in speaking of
the Ontario plaintiff suing under preexisting Ontario law that Kramer went wrong.
11 8 New York has laws that sanction such fraud and keep those who engage in it from
retaining the proceeds. N.Y. INS. LAW§§ 401-410 (McKinney 2011).

2017]

THE RETURN OF THE UNPROVIDED-FOR CASE

803

that only the purposes of preexisting laws count. We should
therefore conclude that New York's policy of preventing insurance
fraud recommends a rule that bars liability against New York
hosts for the facts in Neumeier.
It is true, of course, that New York lawmakers think that
compensation to guests and deterrence of negligence by hosts are
more important than worries about insurance fraud. Otherwise,
they would have enacted a guest statute. But in refusing to enact
a guest statute, they were thinking about cases where the
compensation was to New York guests and the deterrence was of
negligence in New York. When the compensation would be to
Ontario guests and the deterrence would be of negligence in
Ontario, worries about fraud by New York hosts should rise to the
fore.
In short, what's good for the Ontario goose is good for the New
York gander. If a court facing the facts in Neumeier is free to
apply a novel Ontario law allowing guest-host negligence suits, it
must also be free to apply a novel New York law that bars liability
against hosts-a virtual New York guest statute.
So far, I have spoken of two new laws that might be applied in
Neumeier. One is a rule of negligence liability that serves
Ontario's interests. Another is a rule barring liability that serves
New York's interests. But there is a third option. A court might
choose a rule that best serves the aggregate weighted interests of
Ontario and New York in the case. It would do so by balancing
Ontario's interests in compensation to Ontario guests and
deterrence of negligence by hosts in Ontario (both of which argue
for a liability rule) against New York's interest in discouraging
fraud concerning New York insurance contracts (which argues for
a rule barring liability),119
Of course, we have no idea what the result of that balancing is
likely to be. We cannot assume that the result would be Kramer's
recommendation of negligence liability. Assume that the Ontario
legislature assigned the following weights to the competing
policies, using utiles (an arbitrary measure of relative strength of
119 One benefit of this approach is that it would avoid constitutional objections that the
court is jiggering the content of the law to benefit its residents in violation of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.
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preference).1 20 It gave compensation to Ontario guests a value of 3
utiles, deterrence of negligent hosts in Ontario a value of 1, and
discouraging fraud by Ontario hosts a value of 5. As a result, it
concluded that a guest statute was appropriate: Comp.ont (3) +
Deter.ont (1) < Fraudont (5). The New York legislature, for its part,
gave compensation to New York guests a value of 2 utiles,
deterrence of negligent hosts in New York a value of 4, and
discouraging fraud by New York hosts a value of 5. As a result, it
chose not to enact a guest statute: Comp.NY (2) + Deter.NY (4) >
FraudNY (5).1 21 The proper rule for Neumeier would be a rule
barring liability, contrary to Kramer's recommendation: Comp.ont
(3) + Deter.ont (1) < FraudNY (5) .1 22
We can now see why Currie and Kramer insist that
governmental interests be limited to those supported by preexisting
laws. Once the door is opened to freestanding regulatory policies,
there is no way to answer the unprovided-for case at all.
But it gets worse. These freestanding regulatory policies are
relevant not just in unprovided-for cases, but in all conflicts cases.
Consider Babcock u. Jackson, 123 in which the New York Court of
Appeals first abandoned vested rights theory for interest analysis.
Babcock involved a New York guest, a New York host, and an
accident in Ontario. The court read the case as a false conflict.
Ontario was not interested in its guest statute applying, because
the host was not from Ontario. New York, by contrast, was
interested in its negligence law (in its loss-allocating function)
applying, because that would ensure adequate compensation for a
New York guestJ24
But this ignores the freestanding Ontario and New York
regulatory policies that our analysis of Neumeier has revealed. If
these policies are relevant in Neumeier, they should be relevant in

12 0

ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 98-100 (2011).

This assumes that we have solved the problem of interjurisdictional utility
comparisons. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
122 To make matters worse, there is no reason to think that the only relevant New York
policy in favor of a rule barring liability is a worry about insurance fraud.
121

12a

191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).

See id. at 284 ("Comparison of the relative 'contacts' and 'interests' of New York and
Ontario in this litigation ... makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably
the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal.").
124
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Babcock. Put in the mix, Ontario is interested after all. Ontario
lawmakers would want a guest-host negligence rule as a means of
deterring negligence by hosts within the province. As for New
York lawmakers, we don't really know what rule they would want.
True, they have a reason to want a guest-host negligence rule as a
means of compensating a New York guest. But there is also the
worry about fraud by the New York host. This worry was
insufficient to recommend a guest statute when it was up against
compensation and deterrence. But we do not know what New
York lawmakers would say when the worry about fraud is up
against compensation alone. We cannot conclude they would
choose a rule of negligence liability. Using the assignment of
weights to policies described above, they would want a virtual
guest statute: Comp.NY (2) < FraudNY (5).
We also do not know what rule best serves the aggregate
weighted interests of Ontario and New York, which would require
comparing the strength of Ontario's deterrence interest plus New
York's compensatory interest (both of which argue for negligence
liability) against the strength of New York's interest in
discouraging insurance fraud (which argues for a virtual guest
statute). We cannot assume that the balancing would recommend
a rule of negligence liability. Using the assignment of weights to
policies described above, the proper rule would be a virtual guest
statute: Comp.NY (2) + Deter.ont (1) < FraudNY (5).
The analysis is complex, but the upshot is simple. As interest
analysts recognize, laws are enacted without considering conflicts
cases. But interest analysts still insist that these laws apply in
conflicts cases. They are mistaken. The decisions that lawmakers
made about the relative weights of policies in non-conflicts cases
cannot tell us what rule those lawmakers would want for conflicts
cases. The problem is clearest in the unprovided-for case, because
only policies that stood against currently existing laws are
relevant. But these sacrificed policies are relevant in other
conflicts cases too.l 25 Because the balance of regulatory policies in
125 The only exception would be a true conflict in which all of the reasons for each
jurisdiction's law are implicated. An example would be a case with a New York guest, an
Ontario host, and a New York accident. New York is interested because there is a New York
guest to compensate and negligence by a host in New York to deter. Ontario is interested
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a conflicts case is fundamentally different from the balance in a
non-conflicts case, existing law is inapplicable. Courts must make
law. And if they are to make law on the basis of relevant
regulatory policies, they must consider all policies-not just those
standing behind enacted laws.l 26 That is the lesson of the
unprovided-for case.
But how can a court possibly figure out what law serves
governmental policies, when doing so requires considering not
merely the policies standing behind existing laws, but also the
policies standing against those laws-policies that are unlikely to
have been mentioned by the relevant lawmakers? I think the
answer is that it cannot, and that interest analysis must be
abandoned. The considerations are so complex that trying to
identify the proper balance of governmental interests probably does
not get us sufficiently close to the correct solution to be worth it. 127
Under the pressure of the unprovided-for case, interest analysis
collapses, leaving no clear choice-of-law approach in its place.

because there is an Ontario host whose possibly collusive suit would have negative financial
consequences for the province. In such a case, a court would not need to consider the policies
that New York and Ontario lawmakers sacrificed when enacting their laws.
126 I am not the first conflicts scholar to have characterized courts as making law in conflicts
cases. From the American legal realists to Friedrich Juenger to Lea Brilmayer, this has been
a minority (and somewhat disreputable) position in the field. E.g., WALTER WHEELER COOK,
THE LoGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 20-21 (1942) ("[T]he forum, when
confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always applies its own law to the case, but in
doing so adopts and enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly
similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force
in another state or country with which some or all of the foreign elements are connected.... ");
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 163-69 (1993); Lea
Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: The Proper Place of Ethical Reasoning in Selection of
Applicable Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (Donald Earl
Childress III ed., 2012) (discussing what she calls the "common-law method" in choice of law).
But I arrive at this position, I believe, for novel reasons.
127 This is particularly true if the goal is coming up with the rule that best serves the
aggregate weighted interests of all relevant jurisdictions-a goal that I think would be
necessary to avoid any Privileges and Immunities argument that the court is creating law
that discriminates on the basis of residence.

